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Eyewitness memory for the perpetrator or circumstances of a crime is generally worse for scenarios involving
weapons compared to those involving non-weapon objects—a pattern known for decades as the weapon  focus
effect. But despite ample support from laboratory experiments and recognition by experts, testimony concerning
weapon focus is rarely admissible in court. The present article summarizes a selection of key findings within the
weapon focus literature and considers whether the effect warrants consideration by the criminal justice system at
this time. We conclude that weapon focus is sufficiently robust and uncontroversial to guide practice so long as
consideration is given to the circumstances surrounding the criminal event with a particular emphasis on witness
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On the evening of February 11th, 2007, a woman stopped
or gas in Montgomery County, Texas. As she stood next to her
ehicle, an unknown male drew a gun and demanded her purse.
hroughout the 20-second ordeal, the woman reported being
errified of the weapon, and was later able to describe the gun
n great detail. Her description of the perpetrator was less than
recise (i.e., “light eyes”), yet a young man was charged with
he robbery as a direct result. Despite the court admitting expert
Authors Note
Jonathan M. Fawcett, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge,
ngland, United Kingdom; Kristine A. Peace, Department of Psychology,
acEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; Andrea Greve, MRC Cog-
ition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, England, United Kingdom.
JMF was supported by a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship (admin-
stered by the UK Medical Research Council: MC-A060-5PR01) and AG was
upported by the UK Medical Research Council (MC-A060-5PR10) while
riting this manuscript. We would like to thank the police officers, Crown
rosecution, and defence attorneys that consulted with us regarding legal per-
pectives concerning the weapon focus effect. We would also like to thank
imon Strangeways and Paul Hart for their help in acquiring and generating
ur figures, Kerri Pickel for her feedback on an earlier draft of this manuscript
nd the editor and reviewers for their helpful comments during the review
rocess.
J
F
b
t
r
m
l
p
d
d
n
d
pusal, Threat
estimony relating to other eyewitness phenomenon (e.g., cross-
acial identifications), the defence was not permitted to present
xpert evidence as to whether the gun had impaired the woman’s
emory, and the suspect was convicted on the sole basis of her
1 Please note that this paper was handled by the current editorial team of
ARMAC.
∗ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jonathan M.
awcett, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cam-
ridge, England CB2 7EF, United Kingdom. Contact: jmfawcet@gmail.com
1 Herein lies the problem: this case reflects the fact that non-specific descrip-
ions that were potentially impacted by the presence of a weapon are still unduly
elied upon in court despite the poor nature of the victim’s memory. The accused
aintains that he was wrongfully convicted, and no other evidence appears to
ink him to the crime. In fact, evidence suggesting the accused was not the
erpetrator of this crime was generally excluded from court. Recently, Cana-
ian courts have acknowledged that “vague, general, generic and non-specific
escriptions by an eyewitness effectively reduce a case to unsafe resemblance,
ot identification” (R. v. St. Louis, 2014, at para. 69).
The evidence ruled inadmissible in the preceding example
ealt with the weapon  focus  effect—a phenomenon whereby the
resence of an unexpected weapon (e.g., a gun or knife) impairs
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emory for the perpetrator as well as other details of a crim-
nal event, excluding the weapon itself. Forensic experts have
cknowledged the weapon focus effect for decades (e.g., Loftus,
979; Yarmey & Jones, 1983), although the empirical evidence
as emerged more slowly (e.g., Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987).
hile experts remain confident that weapon focus influences the
eliability of eyewitness reports (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, & Hosch,
001), evidence related to the weapon focus effect is rarely
dmissible in court. This is a troubling omission given that jurors
re generally uncertain as to whether a weapon impairs eyewit-
ess memory (Desmarais & Read, 2011). It is likely that the
udicial system has remained reluctant to accept weapon focus
ue to a lack of clarity with respect to whether this literature is
obust enough for application. The present article will address
his concern by providing an overview of the weapon focus
ffect with an emphasis on those findings sufficiently robust
nd uncontroversial to guide practice. We begin with a basic
onsideration of the weapon focus effect and its boundary condi-
ions. We next discuss the difficulties inherent in relating weapon
ocus research to actual criminal events as well as the current
riminal justice response. Throughout we aim to elucidate the
ircumstances under which the weapon focus effect should be
onsidered in court and we make recommendations with respect
o practice.
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igure 1. This figure depicts sample images from a laboratory-based experiment ma
bject was expected given the context (expected, unexpected). Many experiments inc
nd it is this comparison that represents the “canonical” weapon focus effect; howev
he genesis of the weapon focus effect. With this in mind, the inlaid plot depicts the ty
n a tennis court) results in worse memory accuracy than an object that is expected g
r even reversed (as depicted) should the weapon be expected (WE; gun in a shootinS EFFECT 258
How  Do  Weapons  Inﬂuence  Eyewitness  Memory?
Substantial laboratory evidence now exists that the presence
f an unexpected weapon reduces the accuracy of subsequent
uspect identification attempts or witness accounts of a crime
for reviews, Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013; Kocab
 Sporer, 2016; Pickel, 2015; Steblay, 1992). This finding is
epicted schematically in Figure 1, but should not be applied
ndiscriminately. The magnitude (or even presence) of the
eapon focus effect has been found to vary according to the char-
cteristics of the eyewitness, the scenario in which the weapon
s embedded (e.g., the perpetrator, surroundings), and the proce-
ure through which memory is tested. As a result, each of these
actors (witness, scenario, testing procedure) must be consid-
red prior to evaluating the risk of weapon focus for any given
ituation. Each of these factors is discussed in turn.
he  Eyewitness
With respect to the eyewitness, the roles of expectation and
erceived threat deserve special emphasis given that the weapon
ocus effect has been attributed historically to the weapon draw-
ng attention away from other details by virtue of its unexpected
r threatening nature (Loftus et al., 1987). Concerning the
ormer, a great deal of evidence has emerged over the past decade
nipulating both the type of object involved (weapon, object) and whether that
lude only the weapon-unexpected (WU) and object-expected (OE) conditions,
er, we have designed this figure to emphasize the critical role of expectation in
pical findings from such an experiment: a weapon that is unexpected (WU; gun
iven the context (OE; racket in a tennis court). This pattern can be eliminated
g range), and the object be unexpected (OU; racket in a shooting range).
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howing that witness expectation mediates the magnitude of
he effect (for a quantitative model, see Erickson, Lampinen, &
eding, 2014). For example, weapon focus is diminished when
he weapon is anticipated on the basis of the environment (e.g.,
 gun in a shooting gallery; see Figure 1) or due to prior knowl-
dge of the individual holding the weapon (e.g., a gun held by
 police officer; Pickel, 1999). Conversely, the effect is larger
hen the weapon violates cultural stereotypes (e.g., a woman
olding a gun; Pickel, 2009, see also Sneyd, 2016).
In contrast to the link between witness expectation and
eapon focus, the contribution of perceived threat is less clear.
ttentional narrowing due to threat was thought to play a cen-
ral role by early theorists (e.g., Maass & Kohnken, 1989) and
s a common feature of anecdotal reports provided by victims
f weapon crime (as in our example; see also Loftus, 1979).
lthough meta-analyses have shown greater weapon focus in
ituations judged to be threatening or arousing (Fawcett et al.,
013; Steblay, 1992) or involving criminal compared to non-
riminal events (Kocab & Sporer, 2016), laboratory efforts to
uantify their contributions have often failed to reveal a reliable
elationship (e.g., Erickson et al., 2014; Mitchell, Livosky, &
ather, 1998; Pickel, 1998; although see Peters, 1988). Impor-
antly, weapon focus also emerges in austere scenes where threat
s unlikely (e.g., Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990), chal-
enging the view that threat is a necessary  condition for weapon
ocus to occur. Convincing evidence for the role of expectation
ver threat also comes from studies showing that unexpected
on-weapon objects elicit an effect analogous to weapon focus
e.g., someone brandishing a stalk of celery; Mitchell et al.,
998). In this respect, Pickel (1998) manipulated in her experi-
ent whether an object carried by the perpetrator was perceived
s threatening and whether it was expected given the context in
hich it appeared. Her study revealed worse memory for the per-
etrator when an unexpected weapon (i.e., gun) or unexpected
on-weapon object was held (i.e., whole raw chicken or chef
oll in a barber shop) but no overall effect of threat and no inter-
ction between threat and expectation (see also Figure 1).2 Thus,
lthough it is possible that laboratory studies fail to elicit threat
imilar in nature or magnitude to that experienced during actual
riminal events (although see Maass & Kohnken, 1989; Peters,
988), there is little empirical evidence that threat or arousal are
 key factor—at least under typical laboratory conditions. We
ill return to this idea again later, when we consider whether
eapon focus research should be used to guide practice.he  Scenario
Both the scenario in which the weapon is presented and
he individual holding the weapon can moderate the weapon
2 The effects of unexpected non-weapon objects on eyewitness memory are
lso worth considering in the context of the criminal justice system on the account
hat criminal events sometimes involve strange objects – such as a photograph of
 gun (November 19, 2014, “Man threatens to kill staff at Tesco near Cambridge
 while brandishing PHOTO of a gun”, Cambridge News, 2014) or a plate of
acon and eggs (February 23, 2016, “Bacon and Eggs Assault”, CBC News,
016).
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ocus effect independently of witness expectation. For exam-
le, factors diverting attention away from the weapon, such
s a perpetrator with some unusual feature, will diminish the
ffect (Carlson & Carlson, 2012, 2014). The duration of expo-
ure to a weapon is thought to be critical, typically eliciting a
maller effect in experiments involving either brief (i.e., <10 s)
r extended (i.e., >60 s) exposure to the weapon (Fawcett et al.,
013; Steblay, 1992). However, memory for items or individuals
xperienced prior or subsequent to the encounter of a weapon
ust be considered with care, as exposure to the weapon may not
nfluence memory for those details to the same extent (Erickson
t al., 2014). For example, viewing an old acquaintance hold-
ng a weapon could result in relatively poor memory for novel
eatures of the scene, but would be unlikely to affect memory
or features that were already highly familiar. The same would
pply to a stranger who draws a weapon, but then proceeds to
nteract with the witness for an extended period of time, either
ith or without the weapon.
he  Testing  Procedure
Less is known about how the testing procedure interacts with
eapon focus. Evidence now suggests an extended retention
nterval (e.g., testing after a delay of 24+ hours) diminishes
he effect (Fawcett et al., 2013). However, given that retrieval
ccuracy is low in the weapon relative to the non-weapon con-
ition to begin with, the decrease in weapon focus across longer
elays is likely an artifact reflecting declining memory in the
on-weapon condition rather than better memory in the weapon
ondition. Testing procedures in which participants are required
o recall details relevant to the event have shown larger weapon
ocus effects relative to selecting a suspect from a police line-up
Fawcett et al., 2013; Kocab & Sporer, 2016; Steblay, 1992). That
aid, recent research indicates that the influence of weapon focus
n suspect lineups may be more pronounced than originally
onsidered. For example, witnesses appear to have difficulty dis-
riminating a perpetrator from innocent foils in line-ups, and are
ore likely to commit false identifications when a weapon was
nvolved in a mock crime (Carlson & Carlson, 2012; Erickson
t al., 2014; but see, Kocab & Sporer, 2016). This finding is trou-
ling and warrants careful consideration, particularly in light of
he evidence that individuals exposed to weapons are also more
usceptible to false information, introduced for instance through
eading questions or exposure to police suspects (Saunders,
009). Luckily, witnesses may be sensitive to the fact that expo-
ure to a weapon reduces memory accuracy, shown by a greater
orrespondence between suspect identification accuracy in a
ock police line-up and reported confidence concerning those
dentifications (Carlson, Dias, Weatherford, & Carlson, 2016).
hould  Weapon  Focus  Research  be  Used  to  Guide  Practice?
Having reviewed the key findings within the literature, it is
ur view that the weapon focus effect is sufficiently robust to
arrant consideration by the judicial system so long as the cir-
umstances surrounding the crime are considered in tandem.
lthough some applications are certainly in need of further
ttention and development (see Table 1 for some examples), we
WEAPON FOCUS EFFECT 260
Table 1
Sample Applications in Need of Further Consideration Within the Weapon Focus Literature Separated According to Their Locus of Inﬂuence (Witness, Scenario,
Testing Procedure)
The witness
1 Could training produce a lasting reduction in the magnitude of the weapon focus effect in at risk populations (e.g., bank tellers, store clerks)?
2 Are eyewitnesses able to judge the degree to which weapon focus has influenced their memory of a criminal event?
3 Are some witnesses more susceptible to the weapon focus effect than others? What individual difference measures differentiate these
populations?
4 What is the role of threat and arousal in the weapon focus effect when observed under realistic circumstances?
5 Does familiarity with the class of weapon (e.g., a military officer observing a rifle) reduce the impact of an otherwise unexpected weapon?
The scenario
6 How does the effective combat range of the weapon and distance from the perpetrator relate to the magnitude of the weapon focus effect?
7 How does weapon visibility impact the magnitude of the weapon focus effect? How visible must a weapon be to produce the effect? What
about implied weapons (e.g., “Don’t make me take out my gun.  . .”)?
8 How do social cues (e.g., gaze) shape the weapon focus effect for scenarios involving multiple witnesses?
9 Are particular scenarios (e.g., bank robbery) associated with stronger weapon-expectancy cues? Do these cues predict the presence and
strength of the weapon focus effect?
10 Does weapon focus vary as a function of the type of crime or manner in which the weapon is used?
The testing procedure
11 How do police interviewing or investigative techniques differ between weapon and non-weapon crimes and do these differences interact with
the weapon focus effect?
12 Could the ratio of weapon-to-perpetrator or crime event details available in memory bias the extent to which persons are able to accurately
recall weapon details relative to perpetrator or crime event details? If we control for the proportion of details available, do these effects change
in scope?
12 Could a simple measure be developed to assay whether a witness account is likely to be influenced by weapon focus? Are there characteristic
features that discriminate between those accounts that are or are not influenced by weapon focus?
13 Presuming that threat or arousal do contribute to the effect, could reinstating these emotional or physiological states at test improve memory
for the event?
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eote: Some of these applications are novel whereas others have been addressed
re compelled in this evaluation by three converging sources.3
irst, laboratory experiments have consistently demonstrated
mpaired memory for scenarios involving unexpected weapons.
his provides a solid empirical basis for the weapon focus effect
nd its boundary conditions. Second, the weapon focus effect has
een observed in a variety of simulated events (e.g., Maass &
ohnken, 1989; Peters, 1988; Pickel, Ross, & Truelove, 2006)
nd virtual scenarios (e.g., Kim, Park, & Lee, 2014), providing
arying degrees of experimental control and ecological validity.
ence, weapon focus is observable under realistic conditions
mulating natural behaviour while retaining experimental con-
rol. Finally, weapon focus is a common feature of witness
ccounts following exposure to a weapon (for discussion see,
oftus, 1979), suggesting that it also emerges under realistic
onditions. Therefore, it is our view that the question should not
e whether weapon focus influences eyewitness memory, but
nder what circumstances and to what degree.
The circumstances under which weapon focus is most likely
o occur vary in their empirical support. The most robust fac-
or highlighted here is that of witness expectation, wherein
eapon focus is most profound when the weapon is unexpected.
t is therefore important to adopt a multifaceted approach to
3 Our claim that the weapon focus effect is relevant to real-crime scenarios is
upported by the presence of a small aggregate effect observed in a meta-analytic
ynthesis of the current archival and field studies (Fawcett et al., 2013). While
ecognizing this fact we do not wish to give those studies undue weight in light of
ecent practical and methodological critiques of such experiments (e.g., Horry,
alford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2013; see also, Kocab and Sporer, 2016).
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irt, but are in need of further study.
nderstanding the mindset of the witness when the weapon was
ncountered. Were there environmental- or perpetrator-specific
ues that the weapon might appear? Was the perpetrator consid-
red likely to have a weapon? Many of these considerations may
e idiosyncratic and several individuals could witness the same
cenario but experience weapon focus to varying degrees (if at
ll) dependent upon their expectations, background, and under-
tanding of the event. Given that expectations unfold over time,
t is also important to consider cues that build to the appearance
f a weapon. For example, a store clerk who observes a cus-
omer acting suspiciously might expect a weapon to be present
efore a weapon is actually drawn. Although this scenario has
ot been investigated as such, the available evidence suggests
hat forewarning could mitigate the effect (e.g., Pickel, 2009;
ickel et al., 2006). In summary, each witness must be consid-
red individually and in context to determine whether weapon
ocus is a probable concern.
At least two major factors—the effects of test delay and
xposure duration—have been identified largely through meta-
nalysis rather than primary investigations (although, see
ramer et al., 1990). These findings emerge from comparisons
cross studies and hence should be viewed as promising but
ot yet fully established, pending further investigation. Their
iscussion in court is consequently advocated only with suit-
ble caution. The finding that weapon focus is larger for witness
ccounts than suspect identification technically falls within the
ame category, though this distinction is far more consistent,
s demonstrated by difficulties obtaining the effect for suspect
dentification (for discussion, see Kocab & Sporer, 2016). The
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recise cause of this difference across measures is unclear. One
ossibility is that weapon focus simply has a larger effect on
easures of recall (on which most witness accounts are based)
han measures of recognition (which is the basis of suspect
dentification). Others have argued that the difference emerges
ecause weapon focus has a larger impact on suspect absent
ine-ups whereas most investigations of suspect identification
se only suspect present line-ups (Carlson & Carlson, 2012;
lthough, see Kocab & Sporer, 2016). The etiology of this dif-
erence remains to be discovered, but the key fact is that current
vidence supports a moderate effect of weapon presence on
easures of feature accuracy and only a small effect of weapon
resence on measures of suspect identification (Fawcett et al.,
013; Kocab & Sporer, 2016; Steblay, 1992). Thus, whereas
eapon focus should still be considered in the context of a
uspect line-up, the effect seems to have a greater impact on
 witness’s description of the perpetrator.
Similarly, laboratory evidence for the role of threat has
een sparse and, at present, can only be viewed to moder-
te (rather than elicit) the weapon focus effect. However, as
ouched upon earlier, we are unable to rule out the possibility
hat threat elicited in the laboratory fails to encompass the range
f emotions experienced during actual criminal events. Differ-
nt emotions, including threat, are known to cause attentional
arrowing predominantly in scenarios involving an attention
agnet (e.g., a dead body; Laney, Campbell, Heuer, & Reisberg,
004) or an active personal goal capable of capturing atten-
ion (e.g., escape; Levine & Edelstein, 2009). Enhancing the
alience of such magnets and personal goals using an immer-
ive virtual reality simulation of a weapon crime has revealed
omplementary—but additive—effects of threat and expectation
Kim et al., 2014). This preliminary finding suggests that weapon
ocus could involve independent effects arising from threat and
xpectation that collectively influence eyewitness memory. That
aid, the perception of threat by witnesses in real criminal events
ould differ from the physiological threat or arousal experienced
y those witnesses. Such differences may help to reconcile the
iscrepancy between frequent witness reports of feeling threat-
ned, which is in contrast to the yet limited laboratory support
or threat as a causal factor in weapon focus. This is a key
rea in need of greater development using further simulated
vents (e.g., Maass & Kohnken, 1989; Peters, 1988; Pickel et al.,
006) and applied techniques (e.g., Hulse & Memon, 2006; Kim
t al., 2014) capable of balancing experimental control with the
mmersion necessary to emulate the threat experienced during a
rime.
Although considering the boundary conditions summa-
ized above provides useful guidance, we caution that crimes
arely conform to these parameters. Weapon focus is presently
xpected to be largest for a brief crime involving an unexpected,
hreatening weapon that is committed by a previously unknown
erpetrator with no pre- or post-weapon exposure and for which
he witness’s statement is taken within 24 h of the event. Sel-
om do criminal events fit this description perfectly, which may
xplain why most archival or field studies of actual crimes have
eported little or no evidence of the weapon focus effect (e.g.,
ehrman & Davey, 2001; Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 2003;
M
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ut, see Tollestrup, Turtle, & Yuille, 1994). A recent meta-
nalysis has demonstrated an aggregate weapon focus effect
hen these studies are combined, but the magnitude of that effect
s smaller compared to laboratory studies. Interestingly, labo-
atory studies that closely match typical criminal events (i.e.,
ong exposure duration, long retention interval, high perceived
hreat, unexpected weapon) also show a reduced weapon focus
ffect comparable to the aggregate effect for archival or field
tudies. Difficulties observing a consistent weapon focus effect
ithin archival or field studies therefore may reflect the influ-
nce of moderators typical of real-world crime (Fawcett et al.,
013; although, see Footnote 3). Overall, we regard the weapon
ocus effect to be sufficiently robust to be considered in court,
ut we emphasize that each witness account must be scruti-
ized to determine whether weapon focus is relevant, rather
han presuming it to be applicable simply because a weapon
as present.
How  Does  the  Criminal  Justice  System  View  Weapon
Focus?
Finally, in light of the evidence discussed thus far it is
mportant to consider how the criminal justice system presently
valuates weapon focus. While criminal justice professionals
cknowledge that weapon focus may negatively impact mem-
ry, they view their everyday practice as divergent from research
utcomes. For example, police officers often report that weapon
ocus is inconsistent across cases, and memory deficits can be
ircumvented by enhanced interviewing skills. Further, weapon-
elated offences such as robbery (i.e., the “typical” weapon
ocus scenario) are less common than a weapon being present in
omestic violence scenarios (often charged as a level 2 or aggra-
ated assault in Canada; Statistics Canada, 2016; The Daily,
015). The evidence summarized above should enlighten the
erceived inconsistencies in this effect: whereas weapon focus
ay occur for a typical robbery (so long as it adheres to the
pecified boundaries), domestic violence cases might instead
nvolve a variation of this effect with preserved memory for
he perpetrator. In fact, in some instances police officers have
escribed apparently greater weapon focus (and better recall
f weapon-related details) without impaired perpetrator identi-
cation, owing to the victim’s familiarity with the perpetrator
Edmonton Police Service, personal communication, 2016).
verall, from a policing standpoint, weapon focus is commonly
cknowledged to exist, but is an issue for the courts to address.
While it is clear that many judges realize the potential
mpact of a weapon on eyewitness memory (see R.  v.  Turner,
012), few courts have recognized weapon focus as warrant-
ng expert testimony (e.g., Jordan  v.  State, 1996; United  States
. Smith, 1984) despite a wealth of research establishing this
ffect (e.g., Fawcett et al., 2013; Kocab & Sporer, 2016). Even
n recent cases, the judicial response has been twofold: (1) denial
f expert testimony concerning weapon focus (e.g., Benton,
cDonnell, Ross, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2007), and (2) non-
pecific instructions to juries regarding eyewitness phenomena.
urther adding to the problem is the prevalent view that
. . .the problems of identification are clearly within the general
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nowledge and comprehension of judges and properly instructed
uries” (R.  v.  Fengstad, 1994, Supra. 74).4 However, counter to
his widespread belief, the weapon focus effect is often asso-
iated with the lowest scores on surveys of lay knowledge
oncerning eyewitness memory for both judges and jurors, sug-
esting that the effect is not well understood by either population
Magnussen et al., 2008; Magnussen, Melinder, Stridbeck, &
aja, 2009).
Given that weapon focus is not  considered one of the five
enerally accepted eyewitness principles with consensus in the
cientific literature (see Commonwealth  v.  Gomes, 2015), we
ould endorse the two-pronged solution proposed by Wise,
auphinais, and Safer (2007): (a) permit expert testimony when
ase evidence relies heavily on eyewitness reports, and, (b)
ducate the principal participants in the criminal justice sys-
em. Although expert testimony on weapon focus continues
o be excluded, there has been some progress on the educa-
ional front. In the Report and Recommendations of the Supreme
udicial Court Study on Eyewitness Evidence (2013), it was rec-
mmended that model jury instructions should be adjusted to
ncorporate acknowledgement of the weapon focus effect.5 Fur-
her, the Canadian Judicial Council (2012) recommended that
udges use a series of instructions to guide jurors on how to assess
itness testimony, including whether anything may have inter-
ered with or distracted the witness from observing the details
f the event and whether anything unusual happened that would
nhance memory. While these recommendations are a step in
he right direction, there remains no consensus concerning the
valuation of weapon focus in court.
Summary  and  Conclusions
The present article evaluated the merit of the weapon focus
ffect with respect to applications within the criminal justice
ystem. We have summarized a selection of key findings within
he literature and identified areas of further development. It is
ur conclusion that converging evidence from laboratory stud-
es, simulated events, and actual witness accounts support the
elevance of expert testimony concerning weapon focus in cases
nvolving a weapon. In fact, such testimony could prove vital in
ddressing misconceptions concerning the effect amongst both
udges and jurors (e.g., Magnussen et al., 2008). However, we
aution that the particulars of the crime are important, and that
4 While several psychological surveys on layperson and professional knowl-
dge concerning eyewitness factors (including weapon focus) seem to support
his view as a whole (e.g., Desmarais and Read, 2011; Kassin et al., 2001;
agnussen et al., 2009; Read and Desmarais, 2009), they also suggest that pro-
ision of contextual information surrounding eyewitness phenomena increase
ecision accuracy. That said, jurors tend to defer to the knowledge and exper-
ise of judges and assume they are sufficiently knowledgeable about eyewitness
actors to reliably distinguish when experts are warranted (Magnussen et al.,
009).
5 Specifically, the SJC (commissioned by the Massachusetts Court System)
ecommended the inclusion of the following jury instruction if a weapon was
nvolved and the witness saw a weapon during the event: “. . .the visible presence
f a weapon may reduce the reliability of an identification if the crime is of short
uration, but the longer the event the more time the witness has to adapt to the
resence of the weapon” (2013, p. 381).
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hey must reside within the boundaries for which weapon focus
s thought to occur in order to promote accurate translation of
mpirical research to courtroom testimony.
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